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Abstract
In this paper we study the interaction between economic policy and preferences when both
are endogenous. Economic policy results from a vote, whereas individual preferences are
inuenced by specic investment in training and education. The paper focuses on a
particular economic policy: the nancing of the social security system. Moreover, it
considers a specic education investment: parents expect a gift from their children when
old and devote resources in order to arouse the altruism of their children. Therefore,
preferences of the children are trained in relation to the size of the social security system,
which in turn results from the preferences of the median voter. The politico-equilibrium
of this economy is compared to the social optimum.
JEL classication: H55, D9, D64.
Keywords: social security, endogenous altruism.
1 Introduction
This paper is a contribution to the literature about the political economy of social security
systems. A number of authors have intended to understand why the young (working
people), who are more numerous, can be in favor of social security programs that imply a
transfer of their own resources to the old (retired people). The literature provides dierent
answers to this question (Galasso and Profeta, 2002). First, young people may benet
from a public transfer to the old if the economy without intergenerational transfer is
inecient (Browning (1975)), or if public transfers introduce some redistribution within
cohort of heterogeneous agents (Casamatta et al. (1999)). Second, a social security
system may emerge as the equilibrium outcome of a game between generations (Cooley
and Soares (1999), Boldrin and A. Rustichini (2000), Grossman and Helpman (1998)).
Third, if young agents have altruistic preferences towards the old, a public pension system
can more eciently take the place of private transfers, as private transfers lead to strategic
behaviors of parents (Veall (1986), Hansson and Stuart (1989)).
Our contribution is mainly related to this last branch of the literature. We aim
at evaluating the political support for a public pension system in a framework where
preferences are endogenous. In childhood, preferences of an agent can be inuenced by
specic investment in training and education from their parents. Assuming economic
policy is designed through a simple majority rule voting method, preferences and policies
are then jointly determined. Indeed, economic policy results from the preferences of
the median voter, which in turn depend on the education that he received during his
childhood. But, this education is the consequence of the optimal investment of his parents
which depends on the expected economic policy.
More precisely, in our setting, preferences endogeneity is materialized by the fact that
the altruism of children toward their parents is endogenous. The individual degree of
altruism towards the parent is assumed to be partly random and partly determined by
some investment made by the parent in order to arouse the altruism of his children. Of
course, preferences of the children are trained in relation to the size of the social security
system. For a given expected level of pensions, parents can make two types of investments.
On the one hand, they can invest in the altruism of their children, in order to receive some
gift in their old age from them. On the other hand, they can invest part of their revenue
in savings. Both investments are made strategically: parents know that the gift they will
receive is a function of their savings and of the degree of altruism of their osprings.
The main results are the following. First, we state conditions for the existence of
an equilibrium without pension system where parents invest both in savings and in the
altruism of their children, so that they consume in their old age the revenue of their
savings and the gift received from their children. Starting from such a situation, we then
consider the introduction of an exogenous public pension system and show that altruism
spendings and savings tend to decrease with the size of the pension system.
We then turn to the denition of optimal policies. We dene two types of optimal
allocations that we have called egoistic and altruistic. The egoistic optimum is obtained
when the central planner considers the lifetime utility of a young agent without taking
into account of the altruism motive, i.e. the fact that its utility increases with the old-age
consumption of his parent. On the contrary, the altruistic optimum takes into account
the altruism motive. Consequently, with the egoistic objective, altruism spendings are a
loss for the economy. We show that the egoistic optimum can be decentralized with the
pension system and a tax on gifts. The altruistic optimum needs an additional instrument
to be decentralized: a public investment in altruism education.
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Finally, we consider that the size of the public pension system is determined through
the simple majority rule. Assuming that young agents are more numerous, the majority
coalition is formed by the old generation associated with a fraction of the most altruistic
young agents. When the dependance ratio is suciently high, altruism spendings can-
cel out at equilibrium. We then study the impact of imperfect foresight and of ageing
parameters on the size of the pension system.
Our framework gives several positive justications for the existence of a public pen-
sion system. First, a public pension system enforces cooperation among children (voting
equilibrium), while private gifts can lead to a non cooperative equilibrium with free rid-
ing. Second, a public pension system brings a benet with certainty while private gifts
depend on the random altruism of the children. Then risk-averse parents will benet from
the inception of a public pension system. Third, the pension system eliminates strategic
behavior of the parents, when they tend to undersave in order to take advantage from the
altruism of their children. Finally, if altruism spendings are viewed as a loss (as induced
by the egoistic optimum), the public pension system could make them useless and then
may lead parents to spend no resources in order to increase the altruism of their children.
2 The model
2.1 The basic setup
We consider an overlapping generation model. In each period t, a new generation of mass
Nt of individuals living for three periods, is born : Nt = nNt 1, with n  1; n being the
mass of children.
In the rst period of life, an individual of generation t   1 lives with his parent who
spends some amount t 1 in order to arouse children's altruism and stimulate their pref-
erences for his own old-age consumption. Typically, those spending consist of all the
resources used by the parent in order to display the important part that any child has to
play for supporting his old parents, and notably to guarantee some income maintenance
during old-age. Those spending are a public good within the family.
Individuals may dier in their natural compassion for their parents. Although their
parents have made the same altruism spending, two children may have dierent degree
of altruism, because they dier in their aptitude " to convert altruism spending t 1 in
actual altruism. The degree of altruism writes
"
 
t 1

The parameter " is distributed on the interval [0; E] according to a distribution G: The
function  satises the following properties :
Assumption 1  is twice-dierentiable, increasing and strictly concave, with  (0) > 0
and 0 (0) < +1:
In particular, this assumption implies that the parent may choose to devote no re-
sources to altruism spendings and that, if he does so, his children will not necessarily be
egoistic.
Lifetime utility depends on both consumptions when adult ct and old dt+1. dt+1 is a
random variable in period t. For reasons that will become clearer in the following, we
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assume that the utility function is linear with respect to adult consumption. Utility of an
agent born in t  1 is
ct + E (ln dt+1) + "
 
t 1

[ct 1 +  ln dt]
with   0 and where E (ln dt+1) stands for the expected value of old-age utility.
In period t, this individual becomes a worker and supplies one unit of labor. He
allocates net wage (1   t)wt (where  t is the contribution rate to the social security
system) between consumption ct, savings st, altruism spendings t (that aects altruism
of his own children) and gift to his parent. The budget constraint of an adult writes
(1   t)wt = ct + st + gt + t.
When old, he retires and consumes savings returns, total gift of his n children Gt+1 and
pension receipts bt+1
dt+1 = Rt+1st +Gt+1 + bt+1.
Gt+1 is a random variable in t, because parents ignore the altruism of their children, and
therefore the gift that they may receive from them. Consequently, dt+1 is also random.
All variables must be non-negative
ct  0, st  0, gt  0, t  0
2.2 Non cooperative gift
We assume that, within the family, children behave in a non-cooperative way, and take
as given the gifts left by his siblings to their common parent. The optimal gift of a child
of type " born in t  1 maximizes
 gt + "
 
t 1

 ln
 
Rtst 1 + bt + gt +G t

under the non-negativity constraint gt  0, where G t represents the total gifts made by
his siblings. The rst order condition writes
"
 
t 1


 
Rtst 1 + bt + gt +G t
 1  1 (1)
with equality if gt > 0. Since this condition only depends on the total gift Gt = gt +G
 
t ,
only the most altruistic child can make a positive gift. Since altruism spendings are a
public good within the family, the most altruistic child is the one with highest ", that we
denote ". His gift corresponds to the total gift and is a function of altruism spendings
made by the parent in order to awaken altruism of his own children and of old-age income
of the parent
Gt = g
 
t 1; Rtst 1 + bt; "

= max

0; "
 
t 1
 Rtst 1   bt	 (2)
Here, the possibility of strategic behavior of the parent becomes apparent. By choosing
savings st 1 and altruism spending t 1, the parent inuences the level of the gift that
his children will consent to make. One may also notice that the strategic behavior could
lead to highly more complicated analysis with a general utility function. Typically, if the
utility function were not linear with respect to adult consumption ct, gift Gt could not be
set independently of savings st and altruism spending t, and thus would depend on the
decisions of all future generations.
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Equation (2) determines a threshold on the eective parameter " above which families
leave a positive gift. This threshold, denoted by  t, is a function of display spending and
old-age income
Gt > 0, " > Rtst 1 + bt

 
t 1
   t.
In equation (1), the gift Gt and the pension bt appears as perfect substitutes in the
behavior of an agent born in t   1: any increase in pension receipts leads the agent to
reduce his gift of the same amount, leaving the sum bt+Gt unchanged. But, for his parent,
who receives both the gift and the pension, there exists an important dierence between
those two receipts: the gift is risky and depends on the random altruism of children while
pension benets are certain.
2.3 Savings and altruism spendings
A parent does not observe ex ante the degree of altruism of his children. He only knows
that the aptitude to convert altruism spendings into actual altruism of his most altruistic
child is distributed according to the cumulative distribution function H. Appendix 1
shows that H is dened by:
H(x) = G(x)n
An individual born in t  1 chooses spending t and savings st that maximize
  (st + t) +  ln (Rt+1st + bt+1)H
 
 t+1

+ 
Z E
 t+1
ln (" (t)) dH (")
where
 t+1 =
Rt+1st + bt+1
 (t)
;
under the non-negativity constraints st  0, t  0, ct  0.
First-order conditions write
 1 + Rt+1H
 
 t+1

Rt+1st + bt+1
 0; = 0 if st  0 (3)
 1 + 
0 (t)
 (t)
 
1 H   t+1  0; = 0 if t  0 (4)
Equations (3) and (4) describe the trade-o faced by the parent. First, saving brings
him a certain minimum income when old, which is useful only when the altruism of his
children is too low. This will occur with probability H
 
 t+1

. Second, altruism spendings
allow him to expect higher gift from his most altruistic child. Such an investment may
bring positive return with probability
 
1 H   t+1. Both probabilities are also aected
by the two investments.
Assumptions made on technology in the next section imply that savings are positive
at equilibrium. Thus, from now on, we focus on the case st > 0. Moreover, we make the
following assumption:
Assumption 2 The functions  and H satisfy
(i) lim!+1
()
0() > 
(ii) H (0) < 1  (0)
0(0) :
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(iii) H is dierentiable for  > 0, with a positive derivative.
(iv) For any   0 and  > 0 such that  0()
()
(1 H ( )) = 1, we have
H ( )
 
 H 0 ( ) > H ( )H
0 ( )
()
0()   (())
200()
[0()]3

The rst two statements (i) and (ii) make possible the case t > 0. Assumption (iii) is
made for sake of simplicity. Point (iv) will be useful in the next lemma in order to state
the uniqueness of the consumer optimum.
Lemma 1 Under assumption 1 and 2, there exists a unique interior solution to the con-
sumer problem if the gross interest rate Rt+1 is less than
 (0)H 1

1  (0)
0(0)

1  (0)
0(0)
:
If Rt+1 >
(0)H 1

1  (0)
0(0)

1  (0)
0(0)
, then t = 0 and saving is the unique solution of
Rt+1H

Rt+1st+bt+1
(0)

Rt+1st + bt+1
= 1
This last equation can also be written as an equation that determines  t+1 :
Rt+1
 (0)
=
 t+1
H
 
 t+1

The preceding lemma shows that two types of solution to the consumer program may
occur. The rst one, called interior, corresponds to a positive investment in children
altruism t: The second one is associated with t = 0: This last case happens when the
factor of interest Rt+1 is high enough. Moreover, the following lemma gives the properties
of the consumer program, taking Rt+1 as an exogenous parameter.
Lemma 2 The optimal choice of the consumer (st; t) is such that:
1. t is a decreasing function of Rt+1 till it reaches the value 0 for Rt+1 =
(0)H 1

1  (0)
0(0)

1  (0)
0(0)
:
Above this threshold, it remains equal to 0:
2.  t+1 is increasing with respect to Rt+1:
These results have a simple interpretation. An increase of Rt+1 incites people to devote
more resources to savings, and less resources to altruism spendings. Thus, t decreases
with Rt+1 and  t+1 increases.
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3 Equilibrium
3.1 Equilibrium conditions
Firms use a standard constant returns technology F (K;L) and act competitively, so that,
in each period t, gross interest rate Rt and wage rate wt are functions of the capital-labor
ratio kt
Rt = F
0
K (kt; 1)  R (kt) and wt = F 0L (kt; 1)  w (kt)
Capital stock is equal to savings in preceding period
nkt+1 = st
The budget constraint of the pay-as-you-go pension system is
bt = n twt
Assumption 3 F 0K (0; 1) = +1. The revenue of an investment in capital R(k)k is a
non-decreasing function of k; or F 00KK (k; 1) k=F
0
K (k; 1)   1:
Under this assumption, the capital stock must be positive in equilibrium. Thus, the
intertemporal equilibrium is characterized by the following conditions (with st > 0)
 1 + R
 
st
n

H
 
 t+1

R
 
st
n

st + n t+1w
 
st
n
 = 0 (5)
 1 + 
0 (t)
 (t)
 
1 H   t+1  0; = 0 if t > 0 (6)
 t+1  
R
 
st
n

st + n t+1w
 
st
n

 (t)
= 0: (7)
These expressions are three static equations depending on three unknown variables: t;
 t+1 and st: There is no dynamics in this economy because of the particular utility function
considered. Since it is quasi-linear in rst period consumption, t;  t+1 and st does not
depend on the individual income, and are consequently independent of the current capital
stock st 1:
3.2 Equilibrium without pay-as-you-go pension system
We rst state the existence and uniqueness of an interior equilibrium with positive altruism
spendings (t > 0) in an economy without pension system ( t+1 = 0). The equilibrium is
characterized by the following equations
st = H
 
 t+1

(8)

0 (t)
 (t)
 
1 H   t+1 = 1 (9)
 t+1 =
R
 
st
n

st
 (t)
: (10)
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From Lemma 2, equations (8) and (9) dene t and  t+1 as function of Rt+1. From
(10), one obtains
st  

 

 
R
 
st
n

	
 
R
 
st
n

R
 
st
n
 = 0 (11)
In the appendix, we have shown, that the left-hand side of (11) is increasing with respect
to st. Note that with  (R (0)) = H (0) > 0; the LHS is negative for st = 0. The
following assumption will allow to obtain the existence of an interior equilibrium.
Assumption 4 Let us dene smax =    (0)
0(0) : We assume that
smax   H
 
R
 
smax
n

smax
 (A (   smax))
!
> 0
Proposition 1 Under assumptions 1-4, there exists a unique interior equilibrium without
pension system.
3.3 Equilibrium eect of the pay-as-you-go pension system
Starting from the interior equilibrium without pension system, we study how the intro-
duction of such a system inuences the equilibrium.
Proposition 2 For any value of the contribution rate  t+1  0 such that ct  0; there
exists a unique equilibrium (t;  t+1, st). This equilibrium has the following properties:
1. t is a decreasing function of  t+1; till a threshold 
l after which t = 0:
2.  t+1 is an increasing function of  t+1:
3. st is a decreasing function of  t+1:
Proof. Since at equilibrium Rt+1 is a decreasing function of the current capital stock
st; we obtain from Lemma 2  and  as functions of the current capital stock st
 = 	(st) and  = (st)
where 	 is decreasing and  is non-decreasing with respect to st. From (5), one may
derive the following characterization of the equilibrium capital stock st
R
st
n

st + n t+1w
st
n

  R
st
n

H (	(st)) = 0
where the LHS is increasing with respect to st. This proves existence and uniqueness of st.
Moreover, we deduce from the last equation that savings st are a decreasing function of
the contribution rate  t+1: Properties 1 and 2 in Proposition 2 then follow immediatly.
4 Optimal policies
In this section, we rst dene the optimal stationary state of our economy, which is a
generalization of the standard golden rule of the Diamond (1965)'s model. Then we show
that this optimal stationary state can be obtained as an equilibrium for an appropriate
choice of some policy instruments.
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4.1 The optimal stationary state
In our model, the denition of the optimal stationary state is not obvious, and two notions
may be introduced. The rst one is called egoistic and focus on the life-cycle utility of
an agent, i.e. the utility that he obtains from his own consumptions. On the contrary, in
the altruistic stationary state, the social planner takes into account the altruism motive.
We successively consider these two optima.
4.1.1 Egoistic optimal stationary state
The egoistic optimal stationary state is obtained in maximizing the life-cycle utility of an
agent at the stationary state subject to the resource constraint. The program is written
max
(c;d)
c+  ln d
s. t. c+
d
n
+  = f(k)  nk
The solution corresponds to the standard optimal golden rule in Diamond (1965):
k = k^ with k^ solution of f 0(k^) = n
d = n
c = f(k^)  nk^   
 = 0
We assume that f(k^)   nk^    > 0 in order to have an interior solution. Altruism
spendings  are obviously equal to zero since it does not appear in the objective function
of the social planer.
4.1.2 Altruistic optimal stationary state
The altruistic optimal stationary state is obtained by taking into account altruism towards
the parents. Young agents have dierent degree of altruism, corresponding to dierent
values of the aptitude ": Let us assume that the social planner does not observe this
variable and only knows the distribution function. Therefore, the objective of the social
planer becomes the sum of individual utilities, or equivalently, the average utility. In
contrast with the egoistic optimum, the altruistic objective depends on the investment 
in altruism that agents have receive in their childhood:
c+  ln d+ E(")() (c+  ln d)
Thus the program of the social planner becomes:
max
(c;d)
[1 + E(")()] (c+  ln d)
s. t. c+
d
n
+  = f(k)  nk
First-order conditions lead to the following characterization of the solution (assuming that
f(k^)  nk^       > 0 in order to have an interior solution):
k = k^ with k^ solution of f 0(k^) = n
d = n
1 + E(")() = E(")0()
h
f(k^)  nk^      +  ln (n)
i
c = f(k^)  nk^      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The choice of the optimal value of  results from a completely dierent trade-o than the
private investment in the competitive equilibrium. Indeed, the social planer invests in 
because this investment augments the pleasure that agents enjoy from the consumption
of their parents. In the equilibrium, parents strategically invest in the altruism of their
children, in order to receive a gift from them.
4.2 Decentralizing the optimal stationary state
We successively consider the decentralization of the two optimal states, egoistic and al-
truistic. In the Diamond (1965)'s model, it is well know that this decentralization can be
achieved with a intergenerational transfer, for instance a public pension system. In our
model, with endogenous altruism motive, this unique instrument is not sucient. First,
the decentralization of the optimal steady state must leave all agents of the same gen-
eration with equal consumptions. This implies uniform gifts within the family. Such a
situation cannot be obtained since the degrees of altruism is randomly distributed. The
only way to obtain uniform consumption of the young is to make the gifts inoperative for
all agents within each family. A tax on the gifts, denoted by  in the following, can be
appropriate for this aim.
Making gifts inoperative is useful when the social planner has an egoistic objective.
Parents then have no incentives for investing in the altruism of their children and  will
immediately be zero. By contrast, for the altruistic optimum, we have seen that investing
in children altruism is welfare enhancing. Thus inoperative gift leads the government to
be in charge of arousing the altruism of the children. We assume that the government
will play this role by investing an amount  in each family.
4.2.1 Decentralizing the egoist optimum
The egoistic optimum can be decentralized using two instruments: an intergenerational
transfer implying a tax rate  ; and a tax on gifts . The optimal gift of a child of type "
born in t  1 maximizes
 gt + "
 
t 1

 ln
 
Rtst 1 + bt + gt(1  ) +G t (1  )

Therefore, equation (2) becomes:
Gt = max

0; (1  )"  t 1 Rtst 1   bt	
and gifts are inoperative at the equilibrium if  is such:
Rtst 1 + bt
(1  )  t 1  E (12)
Inoperative gifts imply zero altruism spendings: t 1 = 0: The optimal choice of savings
satises
Rtst 1 + bt = Rt
with bt = nwt: We deduce from this equation the optimal value of  that must satisfy:
nk^ + 
h
f(k^)  nk^
i
=  (13)
Using the expression of (12) at the egoistic optimum, we obtain the constraint that 
must satisfy
n
(1  ) (0)  E
9
or equivalently,
1    n
E(0)
(14)
Remark 1 For  and  satisfying (13) and (14), there is no gift at equilibrium, and
therefore no income from the tax on gifts .
For the optimal values  and ; it is straightforward to show that consumptions at the
equilibrium correspond to the optimal one.
4.2.2 Decentralizing the altruistic optimum
The altruistic optimum can be decentralized using three instruments: an intergenerational
transfer implying a tax rate  ; a tax on gifts  and a public investment  to each family
for arousing the altruism of children. The tax on gifts  is needed to cancel out private
transfers, which introduce unsuitable heterogeneity between agents. But, if private gifts
are no more operative, private investment  in children altruism cancels out, and a public
investment  is required. The optimal value of  is equal to the value ^ obtained in the
altruistic optimum. These spendings is nanced through an additional lump-sum tax on
the rst period income of each parent.
Since gifts are inoperative at equilibrium, the optimal choice of savings remains given
by,
Rtst 1 + bt = Rt
which denes the optimal value of  :
nk^ + 
h
f(k^)  nk^
i
= 
The tax  must be set in order to make gifts inoperative, for the level of altruism education
that corresponds to ^: Therefore, (14) becomes:
1    n
E(^)
(15)
5 Political equilibrium
5.1 The preferred tax rate
In period t; young and old people vote on the contribution rate  t that determines the
current size of the public pay-as-you-go pension system. Savings st 1 and altruism spend-
ing t 1 of the parents have been decided in t 1 with respect to the expected value  et of
the contribution rate. Since current capital stock is equal to past savings st 1, the result
of the voting process does not aect capital stock. Thus, the old prefer the highest possi-
ble contribution rate  t. The young generation is divided between two types of children
who will not face the same trade-o with respect to the public pension system. Within
each family, the most altruistic child who is the only one to make a positive gift must be
distinguished from his siblings. Indirect utility of the most altruistic child in a family is
aected by the current contribution rate through the term
(1   t)wt  Gt + "
 
t 1

 ln (Rtst 1 + n twt +Gt) :
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If " > Rtst 1+n twt
(t 1)
(Gt > 0), this term is equal to
(1   t)wt  
 
"
 
t 1
 Rtst 1   n twt+ "  t 1  ln  "  t 1 : (16)
If Gt = 0, then we have
(1   t)wt + "
 
t 1

 ln (Rtst 1 + n twt) : (17)
From the individual view point, the gift and the contribution to the pay-as-you-go
pension system have not the same marginal utility return. Gifts result from a non co-
operative behavior within the family while the contribution to the pay-as-you-go system
imposes to all children to contribute and enforces cooperation. The marginal return of the
contribution to the pension system represents n times the marginal return of an individual
gift.
Let us rst assume that Rtst 1 < n"
 
t 1

. Since (16) is increasing with respect
to  t, the most altruistic agent prefers a contribution rate that leads to zero gift and that
is given by (17). Maximizing (17) gives the optimal value of  t:
Rtst 1 + n twt = n"
 
t 1

: (18)
Now, if Rtst 1  n"
 
t 1

, this agent prefers a zero gift and a contribution rate
equal to zero.
We now turn to children who are not the most altruistic child within their families.
When the public pension system does not exist, they do not make any transfer to their
parent, but they benet from the gift made by the most altruistic child of the family. On
the contrary, when a public pension system is implemented, they are forced to contribute
to a public transfer that implies a utility loss for them. Nevertheless, they may benet from
the fact that the resulting consumption of their parent is now higher than his consumption
without pension system. Such a gain increases with their own degree of altruism, and
vanishes if they have a very altruistic brother or sister. In fact, if the altruism of the most
altruistic child of the family remains operative despite the presence of the pension system,
it means that the consumption level of the parent does not depend on  t and the pension
system is only a cost for the less altruistic children.
Let us consider such a child endowed with a degree of altruism ": As long as the most
altruistic child of the family makes a gift, his indirect utility term corresponding to (16)
is equal to:
(1   t)wt + "
 
t 1

 ln
 
"
 
t 1

(19)
The pension system only entails a cost for him. If the most altruistic child of the family
does not make a gift, the indirect utility term becomes
(1   t)wt + "
 
t 1

 ln (Rtst 1 + n twt) :
If Rtst 1 < n"
 
t 1

; this expression is maximized when  t is such that
Rtst 1 + n twt = n"
 
t 1

: (20)
If Rtst 1  n"
 
t 1

, the agent prefers a contribution rate equal to zero.
To sum up the case of a child who is not the most altruistic child within his family,
 If Rtst 1  n"
 
t 1

; his utility decreases with  t and his preferred tax rate is 0:
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 If Rtst 1 < n"
 
t 1

 and Gt = 0 for  t = 0; his utility is unimodal with respect
to  t and his preferred tax rate given by (20).
 If Rtst 1 < n"
 
t 1

 and Gt > 0 for  t = 0; his utility is rst decreasing, after
increasing and nally decreasing. The preferred tax rate can be either 0 or given by
(20).
Two properties appear through these results. First, preferences of some agents can be
non single peaked. Second, when agents are in favor of a positive tax rate  t; it expression
only depends on the degree of altruism (" or "): (18) and (20) have the same expressions.
The second remark implies that the median voter theorem cannot be applied in our
framework. The tax rate that emerges from a vote is only determined in a particular
case where n is high enough. In this case, the gain associated with cooperation in a
voting equilibrium is high, and the most altruistic agents are in favor of a positive tax
rate, even if they are not the most altruistic children within their family. Therefore, the
majoritarian cooalition will be made by the old agents associated with the most altruistic
agents among the young.
5.2 The Condorcet winner
We admit that all the most altruistic young agents belong to the majoritarian coalition
with old agents, even if they are not the most altruistic in their family. We will check
ex-post that this property is satised at the equilibrium. Under this assumption, the
median voter is dened by his degree of altruism "m such that:
1 + n(1 G("m)) = 1 + n
2
or G("m) =
1
2n
+
1
2
(21)
Proposition 3 Under the assumption n"m  E; if
"m
 
t 1



ln

n"m
E

  1

+
Rtst 1
n
> 0; (22)
the tax rate  t = 
m
t dened by:
Rtst 1 + nmt wt = n"
m
 
t 1

 (23)
is the Condorcet winner. In particular, condition (22) is true for n high enough.
Proof. First consider the case of children who are the most altruistic within their
family. Their indirect utility on  t is unimodal. (23) is the preferred tax rate of such a
child endowed with a degree of altruism "m: Children with a higher degree " > "m are in
favor of a higher tax rate and children with a lower degree " < "m are in favor of a lower
tax rate.
Second, consider the case of children who are not the most altruistic within their
family. Their preferred tax rate is either mt determined by (20) or is 0: Therefore, we
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must prove that all children of this type endowed with a degree of altruism "  "m prefer
 t determined by (23) to 0: A necessary condition is that the child has not a brother/sister
that continues to make a gift with the pension system. This condition will be satised
only if n"m=E  1: Indeed if E > n"m; an agent with a degree of altruism " > n"m would
continue to make a gift to his parent despite the existence of the pension system which
size depends on n"m:
Under the assumption n"m  E; consider an agent who is not the most altruistic
within his family. The dierence between the indirect utilities corresponding to mt and 0
is equal to:
 mt wt + "
 
t 1

 ln
 
n"m
 
t 1


  "  t 1  ln  "  t 1 
This agent will prefet mt to 0 if:
 mt wt + "
 
t 1

 ln

n"m
"

> 0
As "  E  n"m and "  "m; a stronger condition is:
 mt wt + "m
 
t 1

 ln

n"m
E

> 0
Using the denition of mt (23), this last condition can be written:
"m
 
t 1



ln

n"m
E

  1

+
Rtst 1
n
> 0
A sucient condition ensuring this inequality is that n"m=E > e; which is true for n high
enough.
Finally, we have proved that mt given by (23) will be the solution of the voting
process.
5.3 Perfect foresight political equilibrium
In this section, we consider that the median voter is endowed with a degree of altruism
dened by equation (21):
"m = (n)  G 1

1
2n
+
1
2

Let us recall that "m can be the median voter only if n"m  E: In this case, the
Condorcet winner depends only on n and is not aected by the economic policy or by
the current level of capital accumulation. Moreover, we assume that generation t  1 has
made perfect foresight on the value of  t:
An equilibrium is dened by the three equations given in section 3.1 and by the
additional equation (23) which gives the preferred value of  t for the median voter. Thus
we obtain a system of four equations with four unknown variables (t 1; st 1;  t;  t):
R
st 1
n

st 1 + n tw
st 1
n

= R
st 1
n

H ( t) (24)
1 H ( t) 

 
t 1

0
 
t 1
 ; = if t 1 > 0 (25)
R
st 1
n

st 1 + n tw
st 1
n

= 
 
t 1

 t (26)
R
st 1
n

st 1 + n tw
st 1
n

= n"m
 
t 1

 (27)
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From (26) and (27), we obtain that  t = n"
m )  t > E: Thus, H ( t) = 1 and (25)
gives t 1 = 0: Using (24) and (27), st 1 is solution of
R
st 1
n

= n"m (0)
Finally,  t can be obtained from (24), (26) or (27).
The resulting equilibrium leads to no altruism spending: t 1 = 0 and no private
gifts. All agents have the same consumptions at equilibrium, as these consumptions are
not aected by private random gifts. The equilibrium can therefore be compared with the
optimal egoistic stationary equilibrium described in section 4.1.1. The equilibrium level
of savings st 1 is such that:
R
st 1
n

= n"m (0)
when the optimal level s^ satises:
R

s^
n

= n
Therefore, there is under accumulation of capital if "m (0) > 1 and over accumulation
if "m (0) < 1: In the special case where "m (0) = 1; we have st 1 = s^: Moreover, all
equilibrium consumptions correspond to their optimal level. Indeed, at equilibrium, dt is
equal to (from (27):
dt = R
st 1
n

st + n tw
st 1
n

= n"m (0)  = n
and n is the optimal level of d: If d; s and  are equal to the optimal level, c also is
optimal.
5.4 Impact of ageing parameters on the pension system
We study the eect of an increase of n: The median voter corresponds to a value of
"m = (n) such that n"m > E: The following lemma states some properties of function
(n):
Lemma 3  satises the following properties:
1.  is non indecreasing with n: When n tends to be innite, (n) tends toward
G 1(1=2):
2.
d [n (n)]
dn
= "m

1  1
2ng("m)"m

Notice that, following (20), n"m = n(n) determines the prefered tax rate of the
median voter. Result 2 shows that n"m can either increase or decrease with n according
as 2n"mg("m) is higher or lower that 1.
The size of the pension system is described by the individual contribution :
 twt =
n"m (0) 
n
 R
st 1
n
 st 1
n
(28)
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with st 1=n solution of the equation
R
st 1
n

= n"m(0) (29)
The eect of n on the contribution  twt is threefold. First, the number of children
per family aects the desired old-age consumption of the parent n"m (0) ; as stated in
Lemma 3, this eect can be positive or negative. Second, this desired consumption is
divided between a higher number of children; this diminishes the contribution. The net
impact of these two rst eects is negative. The third eect goes through capital revenue
R
 
st 1
n

st 1
n
and rests on the change in the capital stock induced by n. By assumption
3, we know that R(k)k is non decreasing with respect to k: Moreover, from equation
(29), the steady-state capital-labor ratio is decreasing with respect to n"m. Thus, savings
return R
 
st 1
n

st 1
n
decreases with respect to n"m.
To sum up all these eects, the contribution  twt is decreasing with n whenever n"
m
is decreasing with n. If n"m increases with respect to n, the resulting eect is ambiguous.
For instance, consider a distribution function of " with a high density g in the neighboroud
of "m. Then, an increase in n will have a very small negative eect on "m and a sharp
eect on n"m. The resulting eect on the contribution  twt would then be positive.
The size of the pension system can also be described by the ratio of pension receipts to
GDP. With a Cobb-Douglas production function, F (K;L) = AKL1 , this ratio writes
Nt 1bt
AKt N
1 
t
=
Nt twt
AKt N
1 
t
= (1  )  t = "m (0) 
st 1
n
 
  
= "m (0) 

n"m (0)
A
 
1 
  
Thus, the ratio of pension receipts to GDP decreases with respect to n whenever n"m
decreases with n. If n"m increases with n, the eect is ambiguous. The same discussion
about density g in the neighboroud of "m allows to state the possibility of a positive eect
of n on the relative size of the pay-as-you-go pension system.
5.5 Voting on pension system and altruism spending
We now consider a two-dimensional vote. In addition to the vote on the pension system,
we introduce a vote on public spendings devoted to arouse next generation altruism and
nanced by taxes on the adult generation. In period t, those spendings, denoted by
t, will aect altruism of the adult generation of period t+ 1 and are neutral for the old
generation in t. Moreover, the adult generation in t will vote on public altruism spendings
taking into account of their eect on their future pensions. Since the utility function is
linear with respect to rst-period consumption, there is no interaction between the votes
on  t and t.
Utility of the adult generation in period t is aected by t through two terms. First,
this generation will pay a tax t in period t. Second, old-age consumption in period t+1
is n"m (t) . Here, we follow the same line as in the preceding sections: n"
m  E which
implies that there is no private gift Gt+1 = 0 and no private altruism spendings t = 0.
Consequently, the relevant terms in the indirect utility function for the vote on t are
 t +  ln (n"m (t) )
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which reaches its maximum for t =  satisfying (from Assumption 2)

0
 



 

 = 1
At the political equilibrium in period t + 1, the individual contribution to the pension
system now is
 t+1wt+1 =
n"m
 



n
 R
st
n
 st
n
with st=n solution of the equation
R
st
n

= n"m()
The desired old-age consumption n"m
 


 is now higher than in the case without
voting on t, while capital income R
 
st
n

st
n
is lower. The resulting eect on the individual
contribution is positive.
6 Appendix
6.1 Denition of H with repect to G
G is the distribution function of the parameter " among an entire generation, and H;
the distribution function of " among the agents who are the most altruistic among the
n children within each families. When n = 1; we have in particular: H (") = G (") :
Considering a family with n children characterized by their innate parameter "i, we have:
Pr

sup
 
"i
  x = Pr  "1  x \  "2  x ::: \ ("n  x)
= G(x)n
Therefore, we can write:
H(") = G(")n (30)
6.2 Concavity
One can rewrite the objective as a function of % =  () and  and the consumer problem
remains to maximize
Wt (;  ) =  

 %  bt+1
Rt+1
+  1 (%)

+H ( ) ln ( ) +  ln (%) + 
Z E
 
ln (")h (") d"
with respect to  t+1 and t; subject to the following constraints
0   1 (%)   %  bt+1
Rt+1
+  1 (%)  (1   t)wt   gt
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First-order derivatives of Wt are
@Wt
@%
=  

 
Rt+1
+
 
 1
0
(%)

+

%
(31)
@Wt
@ 
=   %
Rt+1
+ 
H ( )
 
(32)
and second-order derivatives are
@2Wt
@%2
=     100 (%)  
%2
@Wt
@%@ 
=   
Rt+1
@2Wt
@ 2
=

 

h ( )  H ( )
 

Since  is increasing and strictly concave,  1 is strictly convex and the sign of @2Wt=@%2
is negative. The determinant of the Hessian matrix of W writes 
 1
00
(%) +

%2


 

H ( )
 
  h ( )

 


Rt+1
2
and is positive if and only if
1
 

H ( )
 
  h ( )

>

 + %2 ( 1)00 (%)

%
Rt+1
2
(33)
where  
 1
00
(%) =
 00 (( 1) (%))
[0 (( 1) (%))]3
=
 00 ()
[0 ()]3
6.3 Existence of an interior solution
From equations (31) and (32), an interior solution satises

0 ( 1 (%))
%
(1 H ( )) = 1 = R
%
H ( )
 
.
From the rst equation, we deduce  as a function of %
 = H 1

1  %
0 ( 1 (%))

=  (%)
which is a decreasing function from H 1

1  (0)
0(0)

to 0 (since lim!+1
()
0() > ).
With the second equation, we obtain R as a function of %
R =
% 
H ( )
=
%H 1

1  %
0( 1(%))

1  %
0( 1(%))
Thus
dR
d%
=
 
H ( )
+ %

1
H ( )
   h ( )
[H ( )]2

d 
d%
17
where
d 
d%
=
 1
h ( )

1
0 ( 1 (%))
  %
00 ( 1 (%))
[0 ( 1 (%))]3

Thus
dR
d%
=
 
H ( )
  %


1
H ( )
   h ( )
[H ( )]2

1
h ( )

1
0 ( 1 (%))
  %
00 ( 1 (%))
[0 ( 1 (%))]3

=
 
H ( )
1
h ( )

h ( )  %
H ( )

H ( )
 
  h ( )

1
0 ( 1 (%))
  %
00 ( 1 (%))
[0 ( 1 (%))]3

6.4 Eect of R on  and  
Dierentiating the rst-order conditions @W
@
(;  ;R) = 0 and @W
@ 
(;  ;R) = 0 with
respect to ,  and R, one obtains
@2W
@2
d+
@2W
@@ 
d +
@2W
@@R
dR = 0
@2W
@@ 
d+
@2W
@ 2
d +
@2W
@ @R
dR = 0
Thus
d
dR
=
1
D

@2W
@@ 
@2W
@ @R
  @
2W
@@R
@2W
@ 2

d 
dR
=
 1
D

@2W
@2
@2W
@ @R
  @
2W
@@R
@2W
@@ 

where
D =
@2W
@ 2
@2W
@2
 

@2W
@@ 
2
> 0
Thus d
dR
has the same sign as
@2W
@@ 
@2W
@ @R
  @
2W
@@R
@2W
@ 2
=  
2
R3
  
 

h ( )  H ( )
 

 
R2
=
2
R2

H ( )
 
  h ( )  
R

From the rst-order condition, we have

R
=
H ( )
 
Thus
@2W
@@ 
@2W
@ @R
  @
2W
@@R
@2W
@ 2
=   
2
R2
h ( ) < 0
By consequence  is decreasing with respect to R.
Let us now analyze the eect of R on  . First, the ratio =R is decreasing with respect
to R: Second, the concavity of the consumer problem implies that H( )
 
is decreasing with
respect to  . Thus, from the equality 
R
= H( )
 
, the threshold  is increasing with respect
to R.
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Since H ( ) is increasing with respect to R and from the equality  
R
= H ( ), we
deduce that  
R
is increasing with respect to R.
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